

Nøthing is Logical

Maria Aloni
ILLC & Philosophy
University of Amsterdam
M.D.Aloni@uva.nl

Slides: <https://www.marialoni.org/resources/BielefeldMay25.pdf>

Linguistics Colloquium
Bielefeld, 14 May 2025

NØthing is logical (Nihil)

- **Goal of the project:** a formal account of a class of natural language inferences which deviate from classical logic
- **Common assumption:** these deviations are not logical mistakes, but consequence of pragmatic enrichments (Grice)
- **Strategy:** develop *logics of conversation* which model next to literal meanings also pragmatic factors and the additional inferences which arise from their interaction
- **Novel hypothesis:** **neglect-zero** tendency (a cognitive bias rather than a conversational principle) as crucial factor
- **Main conclusion:** deviations from classical logic consequence of pragmatic enrichments albeit not (always) of the canonical Gricean kind



Non-classical inferences

Free choice (FC)

(1) $\Diamond(\alpha \vee \beta) \rightsquigarrow \Diamond\alpha \wedge \Diamond\beta$

(2) Deontic FC inference [Kamp 1973]

- a. You may go to the beach *or* to the cinema.
b. \rightsquigarrow You may go to the beach *and* you may go to the cinema.

(3) Epistemic FC inference [Zimmermann 2000]

- a. Mr. X might be in Victoria *or* in Brixton.
b. \rightsquigarrow Mr. X might be in Victoria *and* he might be in Brixton.

Ignorance

(4) The prize is either in the garden *or* in the attic \rightsquigarrow speaker doesn't know where

(5) ? I have two *or* three children. [Grice 1989, p.45]

- In the standard approach, **ignorance** inferences are conversational implicatures
- Less consensus on **FC** inferences analysed as conversational implicatures; grammatical scalar implicatures; semantic entailments; . . .

Novel hypothesis: neglect-zero

- FC and ignorance inferences are [\neq semantic entailments]
 - Not the result of Gricean reasoning [\neq conversational implicatures]
 - Not the effect of applications of covert grammatical operators [\neq grammatical (scalar) implicatures]
- But rather a consequence of something else speakers do in conversation, namely,

NEGLECT-ZERO

when interpreting a sentence speakers create structures representing reality¹ and in doing so they systematically neglect structures which verify the sentence by virtue of an empty configuration (*zero-models*)

- Tendency to neglect zero-models follows from the difficulty of the cognitive operation of evaluating truths with respect to empty witness sets [Nieder 2016; Bott *et al*, 2019²]

¹Johnson-Laird (1983) *Mental Models*. Cambridge University Press.

²Bott, O., Schlotterbeck, F. & Klein U. 2019. Empty-set effects in quantifier interpretation. *Journal of Semantics*, 36, 99–163.

Novel hypothesis: neglect-zero

Illustration

(6) Less than three squares are black.

- a. Verifier: [■, □, ■]
- b. Falsifier: [■, ■, ■]
- c. Zero-models: [□, □, □]; [■, ■, ■]; [△, △, △]; [▲, ▲, ▲]; ...

Zero-models in (6-c) verify the sentence by virtue of an empty set of black squares

- Cognitive difficulty of zero-models confirmed by experimental findings and connected to / argued to explain:
 - the special status of 0 among the natural numbers [Nieder, 2016]
 - why downward-monotonic quantifiers are more costly to process than upward-monotonic ones (*less* vs *more*) [Bott et al, 2019]
 - Core idea of Nihil project: tendency to neglect zero-models explains
 - FC, ignorance and related inferences [MA, 2022]
- (7) a. You may do A or B \leadsto You may do A and you may do B
 b. A or B \leadsto speaker doesn't know which
- Principles operative in Aristotelian logics [MA, 2023; MA & vOrmondt 2023]
- (8) a. every A is B \leadsto some A is B [existential import]
 b. NEVER: if not A, then A [Aristotle's Theses]
 NEVER: if A, then not A

Novel hypothesis: neglect-zero effects on disjunction

Illustrations

(9) It is raining.

- a. Verifier: [/// /// ///]
- b. Falsifier: [☀ ☀ ☀]
- c. Zero-models: none

(10) It is snowing.

- a. Verifier: [❄ ❄ ❄]
- b. Falsifier: [☀ ☀ ☀]; [/// /// ///]; ...
- c. Zero-models: none

(11) It is raining or snowing.

- a. Verifier: [/// /// /// | ❄ ❄ ❄] [\Leftarrow "split" state]
- b. Falsifier: [☀ ☀ ☀]
- c. **Zero-models:** [/// /// ///]; [❄ ❄ ❄]

- **Split state** in (11-a): simultaneously entertains different (possibly conflicting) alternatives;
- Two **zero-models** (11-c): verify the sentence by virtue of an empty witness for one of the disjuncts;
- **Core idea:** ignorance effects arise because such zero-models are cognitively taxing and therefore disregarded.

A new conjecture: no-split

A closer look at the disjunctive case

(12) It is raining or snowing.

a. Verifier: [////// | ***]

[\Leftarrow “split” state]

b. Falsifier: [☀☀☀]

c. Zero-models: [//////]; [***]

- **Split states:** multiple alternatives processed in a parallel fashion \mapsto also a cognitively taxing operation (increasing working memory load)

NO-SPLIT CONJECTURE

[Klochowicz, Sbardolini & MA 2025]

the ability to split states (entertain multiple alternatives) is developed late

- Combination of neglect-zero + no-split can explain non-classical inferences observed in pre-school children [Singh *et al* 2016; Cochard 2023; Bleotu *et al* 2024]

(13) The boy is holding an apple or a banana = The boy is holding an apple and a banana $(\alpha \vee \beta) \equiv (\alpha \wedge \beta)$

(14) The boy is not holding an apple or a banana = The boy is neither holding an apple nor a banana $\neg(\alpha \vee \beta) \equiv \neg\alpha \wedge \neg\beta$

(15) Liz can buy a croissant or a donut = Liz can buy a croissant and a donut $\Diamond(\alpha \vee \beta) \equiv \Diamond(\alpha \wedge \beta)$

Free choice, ignorance, conjunctive *or* and scalar implicatures

- Scalar implicatures compatible with FC and ignorance (but not with conj *or*):

- (16) Pat may eat the cake or the ice-cream $\mapsto \Diamond(\alpha \vee \beta)$ \leadsto
- a. Pat may choose which $\mapsto \Diamond\alpha \wedge \Diamond\beta$ (free choice)
 - b. Pat may not eat both $\mapsto \neg\Diamond(\alpha \wedge \beta)$ (scalar implicature)
 - c. Pat may eat both $\mapsto \Diamond(\alpha \wedge \beta)$ (conjunctive *or*)
- (17) Pat ate the cake or the ice-cream $\mapsto (\alpha \vee \beta)$ \leadsto
- a. Speaker doesn't know which (ignorance)
 - b. Pat didn't eat both $\mapsto \neg(\alpha \wedge \beta)$ (scalar implicature)
 - c. Pat ate both $\mapsto (\alpha \wedge \beta)$ (conjunctive *or*)

- Ignorance and free choice are incompatible

- (18) Pat may eat the cake or the ice-cream, I don't know which
 \nrightarrow Pat may choose which (free choice cancellation)

Comparison with competing accounts³

	Ignorance inference	FC inference	Scalar implicature	Conjunctive <i>or</i>
Neo-Gricean	reasoning	reasoning	reasoning	—
Grammatical view	debated	grammatical	grammatical	grammatical
Nihil	neglect-zero	neglect-zero	—	negl-z + no-split

Experiments

- Degano *et al* 2025: Neo-Gricean vs Nihil on **ignorance inference**
- Bott, Klochowicz, *et al* (24, 25): Nihil vs competitors on disjunction & quantifiers

³Neo-Gricean: Horn, Soames, Sauerland, ... Grammatical view: Chierchia, Fox, Singh *et al*, ...

Modelling cognitive biases in a team semantics

- Natural language sentences translated into formulas of a classical logical language interpreted in a team semantics where we can model biases

Team semantics

- Formulas interpreted wrt a set of points of evaluation (a team) rather than single ones [Hodges 1997; Väänänen 2007]

- Classical modal logic: $[M = (W, R, V)]$

$$M, w \models \phi, \text{ where } w \in W$$

- Team-based modal logic:

$$M, t \models \phi, \text{ where } t \subseteq W$$

- Two crucial features

- The empty set is among the possible teams: $\emptyset \subseteq W$
- Multi-membered teams can model split states

Neglect-zero & no-split bias

- Neglect-zero modelled via non-emptiness atom NE which disallows empty teams as possible verifiers

$$M, t \models \text{NE} \text{ iff } t \neq \emptyset$$

- No-split modelled via flattening operator F which induces pointwise evaluations and therefore avoids simultaneous processing of alternatives

$$M, t \models F\phi \text{ iff for all } w \in t : M, \{w\} \models \phi$$

BSML: Classical Modal Logic + NE

Language

$$\phi := p \mid \neg\phi \mid \phi \vee \phi \mid \phi \wedge \phi \mid \Diamond\phi \mid \text{NE}$$

Bilateral team semantics

Given a Kripke model $M = \langle W, R, V \rangle$ & states $s, t, t' \subseteq W$


$M, s \models p$	iff	for all $w \in s : V(w, p) = 1$
$M, s \models\!\!\!\models p$	iff	for all $w \in s : V(w, p) = 0$
$M, s \models \neg\phi$	iff	$M, s \models\!\!\!\models \phi$
$M, s \models\!\!\!\models \neg\phi$	iff	$M, s \models \phi$
$M, s \models \phi \vee \psi$	iff	there are $t, t' : t \cup t' = s$ & $M, t \models \phi$ & $M, t' \models \psi$
$M, s \models\!\!\!\models \phi \vee \psi$	iff	$M, s \models\!\!\!\models \phi$ & $M, s \models\!\!\!\models \psi$
$M, s \models \phi \wedge \psi$	iff	$M, s \models \phi$ & $M, s \models \psi$
$M, s \models\!\!\!\models \phi \wedge \psi$	iff	there are $t, t' : t \cup t' = s$ & $M, t \models\!\!\!\models \phi$ & $M, t' \models\!\!\!\models \psi$
$M, s \models \Diamond\phi$	iff	for all $w \in s : \exists t \subseteq R[w] : t \neq \emptyset$ & $M, t \models \phi$
$M, s \models\!\!\!\models \Diamond\phi$	iff	for all $w \in s : M, R[w] \models\!\!\!\models \phi$
$M, s \models \text{NE}$	iff	$s \neq \emptyset$
$M, s \models\!\!\!\models \text{NE}$	iff	$s = \emptyset$

[where $R[w] = \{v \in W \mid wRv\}$]

Entailment: $\phi_1, \dots, \phi_n \models \psi$ iff for all M, s : $M, s \models \phi_1, \dots, M, s \models \phi_n \Rightarrow M, s \models \psi$

Proof Theory: See Anttila, MA, Yang, *Notre Dame J For Log* (2024).

Illustrations $\{w_{ab}, w_b\} \not\models a$; $\{w_{ab}, w_b\} \models b$; $\{w_\emptyset\} \not\models a$; $\{w_\emptyset\} \not\models b$; $\emptyset \models a$; $\emptyset \models b$



Neglect-zero effects in BSML: split disjunction

- A state s supports a **disjunction** $(\alpha \vee \beta)$ iff s is the union of two substates, each supporting one of the disjuncts




Figure: Models for $(a \vee b)$.

- $\{w_a\}$ verifies $(a \vee b)$ by virtue of an empty witness for the second disjunct, $\{w_a\} = \{w_a\} \cup \emptyset$ & $M, \emptyset \models b$ [\mapsto **zero-model**]
- Main idea:** define neglect-zero enrichments, $[]^+$, whose core effect is to rule out such zero-models
- Implementation:** $[]^+$ defined using NE ($s \models_{\text{NE}}$ iff $s \neq \emptyset$), which models neglect-zero in the logic

BSML: neglect-zero enrichment

Non-emptiness

NE is supported in a state if and only if the state is not empty

$$M, s \models \text{NE} \quad \text{iff} \quad s \neq \emptyset$$

$$M, s \models \neg \text{NE} \quad \text{iff} \quad s = \emptyset$$

Neglect-zero enrichment

For NE-free α , $[\alpha]^+$ defined as follows:

$$[\rho]^+ = \rho \wedge \text{NE}$$

$$[\neg\alpha]^+ = \neg[\alpha]^+ \wedge \text{NE}$$

$$[\alpha \vee \beta]^+ = ([\alpha]^+ \vee [\beta]^+) \wedge \text{NE}$$

$$[\alpha \wedge \beta]^+ = ([\alpha]^+ \wedge [\beta]^+) \wedge \text{NE}$$


$$[\Diamond\alpha]^+ = \Diamond[\alpha]^+ \wedge \text{NE}$$

$[]^+$ enriches formulas with the requirement to satisfy NE distributed along each of their subformulas

Neglect-zero effects in BSML: enriched disjunction

- s supports an **enriched disjunction** $[\alpha \vee \beta]^+$ iff s is the union of two **non-empty** substates, each supporting one of the disjuncts

$$[\alpha \vee \beta]^+ = (\alpha \wedge \text{NE}) \vee (\beta \wedge \text{NE}) \wedge \text{NE}$$



- An enriched disjunction requires both disjuncts to be live possibilities

$$(19) \quad \text{It is raining or snowing} \rightsquigarrow_{nz} \text{It might be raining and it might be snowing} \\ [\alpha \vee \beta]^+ \models \diamond_e \alpha \wedge \diamond_e \beta \quad (\text{where } R \text{ is state-based})$$

Formal characterization of neglect-zero effects

$\alpha \rightsquigarrow_{nz} \beta$ (β is a **neglect-zero effect** of α) iff $\alpha \not\models \beta$ but $[\alpha]^+ \models \beta$

Neglect-zero effects in BSML: main results

- In BSML $[]^+$ -enrichment has non-trivial effect only when applied to *positive* disjunctions⁴
 - we derive FC and related effects (for enriched formulas);
 - $[]^+$ -enrichment vacuous under single negation.

After enrichment

- We derive both wide and narrow scope FC inferences:
 - Narrow scope FC: $[\Diamond(\alpha \vee \beta)]^+ \models \Diamond\alpha \wedge \Diamond\beta$
 - Universal FC: $[\forall x \Diamond(\alpha \vee \beta)]^+ \models \forall x (\Diamond\alpha \wedge \Diamond\beta)$
 - Double negation FC: $[\neg\neg\Diamond(\alpha \vee \beta)]^+ \models \Diamond\alpha \wedge \Diamond\beta$
 - Wide scope FC: $[\Diamond\alpha \vee \Diamond\beta]^+ \models \Diamond\alpha \wedge \Diamond\beta$ (if R is indisputable)
- while no undesirable side effects obtain with other configurations:
 - Dual prohibition: $[\neg\Diamond(\alpha \vee \beta)]^+ \models \neg\Diamond\alpha \wedge \neg\Diamond\beta$

Before enrichment

- The NE-free fragment of BSML is equivalent to classical modal logic (ML):

$$\alpha \models_{BSML} \beta \text{ iff } \alpha \models_{ML} \beta \quad [\text{if } \alpha, \beta \text{ are NE-free}]$$

$$[\text{if } \alpha \text{ is NE-free: } M, s \models \alpha \text{ iff for all } w \in s : M, \{w\} \models \alpha]$$
- But we can capture the infelicity of **epistemic contradictions** [Yalcin, 2007] by putting team-based constraints on the accessibility relation:
 - ① Epistemic contradiction: $\Diamond\alpha \wedge \neg\alpha \models \perp$ (if R is state-based)
 - ② Non-factivity: $\Diamond\alpha \not\models \alpha$

⁴MA (2022) Logic and Conversation: the case of free choice. *Semantics and Pragmatics* 15(5).

Formal characterization zero and no-zero models

(M, s) is a **zero-model** for α iff $M, s \models \alpha$, but $M, s \not\models [\alpha]^+$

(M, s) is a **no-zero verifier** for α iff $M, s \models [\alpha]^+$

Many no-zero verifiers for enriched disjunction





Figure: Models for enriched $[a \vee b]^+$.

- 1 Neglect-zero enrichment does not derive **scalar implicatures**;
- 2 Neglect-zero enrichment neither derives **no-uncertain inferences** \mapsto in contrast to standard neo-Gricean approach to ignorance
- 3 **No-split** verifiers compatible with neglect-zero enrichments
 - **No-split conjecture**: only **no-split** verifiers accessible to 'conjunctive' pre-school children.

[Klochowicz, Sbardolini, MA]

Neglect-zero effects in BSML: possibility vs uncertainty

- More no-zero verifiers for $a \vee b$:



- Two components of full ignorance ('speaker doesn't know which'):⁵
 (20) It is raining or it is snowing ($\alpha \vee \beta$) \leadsto
 a. Uncertainty: $\neg \Box_e \alpha \wedge \neg \Box_e \beta$
 b. Possibility: $\Diamond_e \alpha \wedge \Diamond_e \beta$ (equiv $\neg \Box_e \neg \alpha \wedge \neg \Box_e \neg \beta$)
- Fact:** Only possibility derived as neglect-zero effect:
 - $[a \vee b]^+ \models \Diamond_e a \wedge \Diamond_e b$, but $[a \vee b]^+ \not\models \neg \Box_e a \wedge \neg \Box_e b$ (R is state-based)
 - $\{w_{ab}, w_a\} \models [a \vee b]^+$, but $\not\models \neg \Box_e a$
 - $\{w_{ab}\} \models [a \vee b]^+$, but $\not\models \neg \Box_e a$; $\not\models \neg \Box_e b$

⁵Degano, Marty, Ramotowska, MA, Breheny, Romoli, Sudo. *Nat Lang Sem*, 2025.

Two derivations of full ignorance

① Standard neo-Gricean derivation

[Sauerland 2004]

(i) Uncertainty derived through **quantity** reasoning

(21) $\alpha \vee \beta$ ASSERTION

(22) $\neg \Box_e \alpha \wedge \neg \Box_e \beta$ UNCERTAINTY (from QUANTITY)

(ii) Possibility derived from uncertainty and **quality** about assertion

(23) $\Box_e(\alpha \vee \beta)$ QUALITY ABOUT ASSERTION

(24) $\Rightarrow \Diamond_e \alpha \wedge \Diamond_e \beta$ POSSIBILITY

② Neglect-zero derivation

(i) Possibility derived as **neglect-zero** effect

(25) $\alpha \vee \beta$ ASSERTION

(26) $\Diamond_e \alpha \wedge \Diamond_e \beta$ POSSIBILITY (from NEGLECT-ZERO)

(ii) Uncertainty derived from possibility and **scalar reasoning**

(27) $\neg(\alpha \wedge \beta)$ SCALAR IMPLICATURE

(28) $\Rightarrow \neg \Box_e \alpha \wedge \neg \Box_e \beta$ UNCERTAINTY

Neo-Gricean vs neglect-zero explanation

Contrasting predictions of competing accounts of ignorance

- **Neo-Gricean**: No possibility without uncertainty
- **Neglect-zero**: Possibility derived independently from uncertainty

Experimental findings

[Degano *et al* 2025]

- Using adapted mystery box paradigm, compared conditions in which
 - both uncertainty and possibility are false [zero-model]
 - uncertainty false but possibility true [no-zero, no-uncertain model]
 - Less acceptance when possibility is false (95% vs 44%)
- ⇒ Evidence that possibility can arise without uncertainty
- A challenge for the traditional neo-Gricean approach




Figure: Models for $(a \vee b)$

Neglect-zero effects on quantifiers

- So far focus on disjunction (propositional BSML)
- NEXT: neglect-zero effects on quantifiers (first order qBSML \rightarrow)⁶
- Same methodology (summarized below) but now we work with a **first order language** and teams are defined as **sets of world-assignment pairs**

Summary neglect-zero effects in team semantics

- Natural language sentences translated into formulas α of a classical logical language
- Logical language interpreted in a team semantics where we can model neglect-zero (via NE)

α : literal meaning $[\alpha]^+$: neglect-zero enriched meaning

- Formal characterisation of zero-models and neglect-zero effects:
 - A **zero-model** for α is one which verifies α but does not verify $[\alpha]^+$

$$(M, t) \text{ zero-model for } \alpha \text{ iff } M, t \models \alpha \text{ but } M, t \not\models [\alpha]^+$$
 - β is a **neglect-zero effect** of α iff β follows only if we rule out possible zero-models of α :

$$\alpha \rightsquigarrow_{nz} \beta \text{ iff } \alpha \not\models \beta \text{ but } [\alpha]^+ \models \beta$$

⁶MA & vOrmondt, Modified numerals and split disjunction. *J of Log Lang and Inf* (2023)

Neglect-zero effects on quantifiers

Predictions of qBSML \rightarrow

- (29) Less than three squares are black $\mapsto \forall xyz((Sx \wedge Bx \wedge \dots) \rightarrow (x = y \vee \dots))$
- a. Verifier: $[\blacksquare, \square, \blacksquare]$
 - b. Falsifier: $[\blacksquare, \blacksquare, \blacksquare]$
 - c. Zero-models: $[\square, \square, \square]; [\blacktriangle, \blacktriangle, \blacktriangle]; \dots \rightsquigarrow_{nz}$ there are black squares
- (30) Every square is black. $\mapsto \forall x(Sx \rightarrow Bx)$
- a. Verifier: $[\blacksquare, \blacksquare, \blacksquare]$
 - b. Falsifier: $[\blacksquare, \square, \blacksquare]$
 - c. Zero-models: $[\triangle, \triangle, \triangle]; [\blacktriangle, \blacktriangle, \blacktriangle]; \dots \rightsquigarrow_{nz}$ there are squares
- (31) No squares are black. $\mapsto \forall x(Sx \rightarrow \neg Bx)$
- a. Verifier: $[\square, \square, \square]$
 - b. Falsifier: $[\blacksquare, \square, \square]$
 - c. Zero-models: $[\triangle, \triangle, \triangle]; [\blacktriangle, \blacktriangle, \blacktriangle]; \dots \rightsquigarrow_{nz}$ there are squares
- (32) Every square is red or white. $\mapsto \forall x(Sx \rightarrow (Rx \vee Wx))$
- a. Verifier: $[\textcolor{red}{\blacksquare}, \square, \textcolor{red}{\blacksquare}]$
 - b. Falsifier: $[\textcolor{red}{\blacksquare}, \square, \blacksquare]$
 - c. Zero-models: $[\textcolor{red}{\blacksquare}, \textcolor{red}{\blacksquare}, \textcolor{red}{\blacksquare}]; [\square, \square, \square]; \dots \rightsquigarrow_{nz}$ there are white & red squares

These predictions tested in Bott, Klochowicz, Schlotterbeck *et al* (2024, 2025)

Experimenting with quantifiers and disjunction

Four non-classical interpretations

- (33)
- a. Some of the squares are black \Rightarrow not all of the squares are black [UB]
 - b. Each square is red or white \Rightarrow there are white squares and red squares [DIST]
 - c. Less than 3 squares are black \Rightarrow there are some black squares [ES-scope]
 - d. Less than 3/every/no squares are black \Rightarrow there are some squares [ES-restrictor]

Three competing accounts

	UB	DIST	ES-scope	ES-restrictor
Alternative-based	implicature	implicature	implicature	implicature
Bott <i>et al</i> , 2019	—	—	neglect-zero	presupposition
Nihil	—	neglect-zero	neglect-zero	neglect-zero

Two experiments

- Exp 1: Answering questions about the emptyset (Bott *et al*, SuB 2024)
- Exp 2: Priming with zero-models (Klochowicz *et al*, CogSci 2025)

Three main conclusions

- ① Clear evidence that ES-restrictor is a presupposition (Exp 1)
- ② Evidence that UB differs from both ES-scope and DIST (Exp1 and Exp2)
- ③ Some evidence that ES-scope and DIST involve the same cognitive process (Exp 2)

Experimenting with quantifiers and disjunction


Non-classical interpretations

- (34)
- a. Some of the squares are black \Rightarrow not all of the squares are black [UB]
 - b. Each square is red or white \Rightarrow there are white squares and red squares [DIST]
 - c. Less than 3 squares are black \Rightarrow there are some black squares [ES-scope]
 - d. Less than 3/every/no squares are black \Rightarrow there are some squares [ES-restrictor]

Exp1: Bott et al, SuB 2024

- Question-answer task:


- (35) Ist jedes Dreieck entweder rot oder blau? Ja/Nein/Komische Frage
(Is every triangle either red or blue?) Yes/No/Odd question



empty restr



DIST target (zero-model)



control 'yes'



control 'no'

- Main results:

- 1 Evidence that ES-restrictor is a presupposition: questions in empty restrictor models uniformly perceived as odd
- 2 ES-scope (37%) and DIST (23%) unaffected by question environment; UB much less available (10%, while 40% when unembedded)
- 3 Inconclusive evidence on whether ES-scope and DIST had the same source

Experimenting with quantifiers and disjunction

Non-classical interpretations

- (36)
- a. Some of the squares are black \Rightarrow not all of the squares are black [UB]
 - b. Each square is red or white \Rightarrow there are white and red squares [DIST]
 - c. At most 2 squares are black \Rightarrow there are some black squares [ES-scope, sup]
 - d. Less than 3 squares are black \Rightarrow there are some black squares [ES-scope, comp]

Three competing accounts

	UB	DIST	ES-scope	ES-restrictor
Alternative-based	implicature	implicature	implicature	implicature
Bott et al 2019	—	—	neglect-zero	presupposition
Nihil	—	neglect-zero	neglect-zero	neglect-zero

Exp2: Klochowicz, Schlotterbeck *et al*, CogSci 2025, SuB 2025

- Tested whether frequency of strengthening in (36-d) changed after participants were primed to suspend other strengthenings in (36-a-c).
- Results:
 - ① Semantic priming between DIST and ES-scope
 - ② No priming between UB and ES-scope
 - ③ No trial-to-trial priming from ES-scope (sup) to ES-scope (com) but spill-over and adaptation effects

Conclusions

- FC, ignorance, ES-scope: a mismatch between logic and language
- Grice's insight:
 - stronger meanings can be derived paying more “attention to the nature and importance to the conditions governing conversation”
- Nihil proposal: non-classical inferences consequences of cognitive biases
 - FC, ES-scope and related inferences as neglect-zero effects

Literal meanings (classical fragment) + cognitive factor (NE) \Rightarrow FC, possibility, ES-scope, DIST, etc

- Conjunctive *or* as no-zero + no-split effect

Literal meanings (classical fragment) + cognitive factors (NE, F) \Rightarrow conjunctive *or*

- Implementation in (extensions of) BSML, a team-based modal logic
- Experiments provided some evidence in agreement with the neglect-zero hypothesis, but some inconclusive results:
 - EEG & eye-tracking experiment (Ramatowska *et al*);
 - Working memory and neglect-zero (double-task exp) (Ramatowska and MA)
- More experiments needed
 - Acquisition of zero (Ramatowska *et al*)
 - ...

Collaborators & related (future) research

Logic

Proof theory ([Anttila, Yang](#)); expressive completeness ([Anttila, Knudstorp](#)); bimodal perspective ([Knudstorp, Baltag, van Benthem, Bezhanishvili](#)); qBSML ([van Ormondt](#)); BiUS & qBiUS ([MA](#)); typed BSML ([Muskens](#)); connexive logic ([Knudstorp, Ziegler & MA](#)); ...

Language

FC cancellations ([Pinton, Hui](#)); modified numerals ([vOrmondt](#)); attitude verbs ([Yan](#)); conditionals ([Flachs, Ziegler](#)); questions ([Klochowicz](#)); quantifiers ([Klochowicz, Bott, Schlotterbeck](#)); indefinites ([Degano](#)); homogeneity ([Sbardolini](#)); acquisition ([Klochowicz, Sbardolini](#)); experiments ([Degano, Klochowicz, Ramotowska, Bott, Schlotterbeck, Marty, Breheny, Romoli, Sudo, Szymanik, Visser](#)); ...

THANK YOU!⁷

⁷This work was supported by NWO OC project *Nothing is Logical* (grant no 406.21.CTW.023).